



UPRT: The Three Pillars of Prevention



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Topics

- The problem with LOC-I
- Common Precursors to LOC-I
- The Three Pillars of Prevention



The Problem with Loss of Control

Colgan Air – Buffalo 2009



The Problem with Loss of Control

Turkish Airlines – Amsterdam 2009



The Problem with Loss of Control

Air France – Atlantic Ocean 2009



The Problem with Loss of Control

Pinnacle Airlines – Jefferson City 2004



The Problem with Loss of Control

West Caribbean Airlines – Venezuela 2005



The Problem with Loss of Control

Air Asia – Indonesia 2014



Common Precursors to Loss of Control



Environmental Factors

- Severe turbulence, including clear air and mountain wave turbulence.
- Windshear;
- Thunderstorms;
- Microbursts;
- Wake turbulence; and
- Aircraft icing

Common Precursors to Loss of Control



Aircraft System Anomalies

- Flight instruments;
- Autoflight systems; and
- Flight control and other anomalies

Common Precursors to Loss of Control



Misinterpretation or Breakdowns in Cross-checking Information



Common Precursors to Loss of Control



Adjusting Attitude and Power



Common Precursors to Loss of Control



Vertigo or Spatial Disorientation



Common Precursors to Loss of Control



Distraction from Primary Cockpit Duties



Common Precursors to Loss of Control

Inattention



Common Precursors to Loss of Control



Improper Use of Aircraft Automation



Common Precursors to Loss of Control



Pilot Techniques
(including Pilot Induced Oscillation Avoidance or Recovery)



Common Precursors to Loss of Control

Surprise

An unexpected event that violates a pilot's expectations and can affect the mental processes used to respond to the event

(FAA, 2015)



Common Precursors to Loss of Control

Startle

An uncontrollable, automatic muscle reflex, raised heart rate, blood pressure, etc., elicited by exposure to a sudden, intense event that violates a pilot's expectations.

(FAA, 2015)



Prevention of LOC-I



Prevention of Loss of Control remains the highest priority for dealing with the LOC-I problem.

There needs to be holistic processes put in place which allow more attention to be focussed on the problem at both an organisational and personal level.

Becoming widespread across the world



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

IATA

1st Edition

	Applicability	Process map
Affected regulated and declared:	Part-C, Part-PA, Part-CA, Part-ORA, Part-ORD, Part-ORD, CS-CFL, CS-CE, CS-STE11A) and associated AMSG	Concept Paper: Yes Terms of Reference (Issue 2): 30.4.2015
Affected stakeholders:	Right owners, institutions, manufacturers, Approval Rating Organisations, JSTD and/or operators, workplace operators, ETO manufacturers, MAA	Risk type: Full Technical consultation during NPS drafting: Yes Drafting of NPS consultation: 2 months
Driver/Impetus:	Safety, regulatory harmonisation	Review question: Yes
References:	PRAN-2012-01, PRAN-2012-05, PRAN-2013-01, PRAN-2013-16, PRAN-2013-40, PRAN-2013-41, PRAN-2013-46, PRAN-2017-01, NTFB-2012-001, SPAN-2011-018, and ESQA-2011-001 European Aviation Safety Plan (EASp) and SESAR-2011-01, SESAR-2011-02	Finalised consultation: Yes Publication date of the Opinion: 2016/01 Publication date of the Decision: 2017-01

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The Three Pillars of Prevention





The 1st Pillar: Knowledge Elements

- Aerodynamics;
- Causes and contributing factors of upsets;
- Safety reviews of accidents and incidents relating to aircraft upsets;
- G awareness;
- Energy management;
- Flight path management;
- Recognition;
- Upset prevention and recovery techniques;
- System malfunctions;
- Various specialised training elements (e.g., spiral dives and recovery from stick-pusher);
- Human factors
- Recovery procedures;
- Factors leading to a stall event;
- Airplane-specific systems knowledge; and
- Airplane certification differences

The 2nd Pillar: Motivation

While Pilots may practise emergencies in the sim for perhaps four days a year, the remainder of the 360+ days are often routine and emergency-free.

This leads to a '**Conditioned Expectation for Normalcy**'

On those rare occasions when things do go wrong, then a lack of expectation can produce some heightened surprise and stress reactions, with negative effects on situation outcome.

The 3rd Pillar: Effective Monitoring

Loss of Control Action Group



Monitoring Matters

Guidance on the Development of Pilot Monitoring Skills
CAA Paper 2013/02



BRITISH AIRWAYS

easyJet


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The 3rd Pillar: Effective Monitoring

The following are some of the sub-skills/ actions required to actually perform the monitoring task:

Attention management: Procedures/techniques for directing a pilot's attention to a particular place at a particular time.

Deliberate checking: The active, disciplined and effortful action a pilot must take to look for something rather than just look at something, including the devotion of adequate visual dwell time on the thing being checked

Cross-checking/cross-verifying: Comparing separate, independent sources of information to confirm or refute understanding derived from the initial source.

The 3rd Pillar: Effective Monitoring

What to monitor:

Flight path: Monitoring the trajectory and energy state of the aircraft, power settings and the automated systems directly affecting flight path

Systems: Monitoring of aircraft systems, excluding those directly affecting the flight path

Operational factors: Monitoring other operational factors affecting the flight

Crew/situational awareness: Monitoring the actions/ condition of the other pilot(s) and crew/situational awareness

The 3rd Pillar: Effective Monitoring

Additional Guidance for effective monitoring:

- 'Following SOPs consistently;
- Clearly communicating deviations to other crewmembers;
- Aggressively managing distractions;
- Remaining vigilant;
- Intervening if flight guidance modes or aircraft actions don't agree with expected actions;
- Continuously comparing known pitch/power settings to current flight path performance;
- Considering that the primary flight displays and navigation displays (PFD, ND) might be "lying" and always being on the lookout for other evidence that confirms or disconfirms what the displays are saying;
- Methodically regaining flight path situational awareness after completing non-flight-related tasks; and,
- Alerting other crewmembers when monitoring is inhibited (e.g., heads down).

Questions?

